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Bandimere v. SEC: Significant Authority Exists Without
Finality
I. Introduction
“Liberty requires accountability.”1
The Framers of the Constitution could not have imagined our sprawling
administrative system, which “wields vast power and touches almost every
aspect of daily life.”2 Nor could they have envisioned executive branch
officials called “administrative law judges” (ALJs) issuing decisions and
distributing punishment to citizens that violate the law. But they were
keenly aware of the threat posed by an unaccountable government—that
“widely distributed appointment power subverts democratic government”
by preventing citizens from tracing government action to an accountable,
elected leader.3 In fact, the founders noted that when the appointment
power is dispersed among multiple people, “[s]candalous appointments to
important offices” are made, making it difficult “to determine by whose
influence [the people's] interests have been committed to hands so
unqualified and so manifestly improper.”4 Accordingly, the framers created
a structural safeguard against unaccountable administration: the
Appointments Clause of the Constitution, which requires that any officer of
the United States be appointed by the President, the head of a department,
or a court of law.5
By “limiting the appointment power” to a specified set of actors known
to the public, the Appointments Clause guarantees that administrators
entrusted with significant power are “accountable to political force and the
will of the people.”6 The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) ALJs
wield far-reaching, coercive powers—they preside over hearings, “rule on
the admissibility [and credibility] of evidence,” and issue opinions.7 Yet,
SEC ALJs are protected from direct control by the electorate because they
are not appointed by the President, the head of the SEC, or a court of law.8
To date, the issue of whether ALJs are officers within the meaning of the
1. Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1234 (2015) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
2. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010).
3. Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 885 (1991).
4. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 408 (Alexander Hamilton) (ABA ed., 2009).
5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
6. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 884.
7. Id. at 868, 881-82.
8. 5 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012); 5 C.F.R. § 930.201 (2018).
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Appointments Clause has sharply divided the federal courts of appeals.9 In
Raymond J. Lucia Companies, Inc. v. SEC, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that SEC ALJs are not
subject to Appointments Clause requirements because they are
“employees,” not “inferior officers,” and can thus be hired through a
competitive process overseen by the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM).10 In contrast, the recent decision by the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Bandimere v. SEC held that SEC ALJs are “inferior officers”
because they exercise significant discretion, and so they must be appointed
as dictated by the Appointments Clause.11 The D.C. Circuit’s ruling against
Lucia stands in direct conflict with the Tenth Circuit ruling in Bandimere.
Both Bandimere and Lucia filed petitions for certiorari.12 The Supreme
Court granted Lucia’s petition because it was a better vehicle to decide the
issue. Lucia was likely preferable over Bandimere because Justice Gorsuch
was still a judge on the Tenth Circuit when the SEC asked for a rehearing
en banc of the Bandimere decision.13
By granting Lucia’s petition for certiorari,14 the Supreme Court indicated
that ensuring ALJs are constitutionally appointed is now more important
than ever. Since the Dodd-Frank Act was passed in 2010, there has been a
dramatic increase in actions brought as administrative proceedings before
ALJs rather than as civil actions in court.15 This increase occurred because
9. See, e.g., Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Inc. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d
sub nom. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018); SEC v. Bandimere, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th
Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018).
10. 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044
(2018).
11. 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc denied, 855 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir.
2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2706 (2018).
12. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Lucia, 832 F.3d 277 (No. 17-130); Petition for Writ
of Certiorari, Bandimere, 844 F.3d 1168 (No. 17-475).
13. See Brief for Amici Curiae Raymond J. Lucia in Support of Neither Party at 5-7,
Bandimere, 844 F.3d 1168 (No. 17-475).
14. Lucia v. SEC, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
15. “Prior to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010, the SEC historically brought
approximately 60 percent of its new cases as administrative proceedings. In contrast, over 80
percent of the new enforcement actions in the first half of fiscal year 2015 were filed as
administrative proceedings.” Sara Gilley, Heather Lazur & Alberto Vargas, SEC Focus on
Administrative Proceedings: Midyear Checkup, LAW 360 (May 27, 2015),
https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Articles/2015-Midyear-Checkup-on-SECAdministrative-Proceedings; see also SEC Enforcement Activity—First Half FY 2017
Update, CORNERSTONE RES., https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Research/SECEnforcement-Activity-First-Half-FY-2017-Update (last visited Feb. 13, 2018).
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the Dodd-Frank Act provided wider discretion in forum selection.16
Because of this recent surge in administrative proceedings, the
constitutionality of ALJs has become increasingly important. The rise in
administrative proceedings appropriately carries with it a more prominent
role in agency policymaking on the part of ALJs.17 It also shifts
responsibility for construing and interpreting the securities laws from
federal courts to ALJs, because federal courts reviewing administrative
decisions defer to ALJ decisions.18 “Any [individual] with such ample
policymaking” influence should ultimately “be accountable to the will of
the people through their elected officials.”19 In light of the increasingly
central role that SEC ALJs have in adjudicating enforcement actions and
molding the policy and law governing individuals and businesses, it is
imperative that the structural safeguards provided by the Appointments
Clause allow the public to easily identify and hold accountable the officials
responsible for appointing the ALJs.
Reversing the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court agreed with the Tenth
Circuit, finding that SEC ALJs are “inferior officers.”20 Critics of the Tenth
Circuit’s decision in Bandimere and the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia
have argued that because SEC ALJs were found to have held their positions
in violation of the Constitution, then potentially hundreds (if not thousands)
of prior SEC decisions are in jeopardy of being invalidated.21 In addition, as
Judge McKay pointed out in his Bandimere dissent, a finding that SEC
ALJs are “inferior officers” could potentially mean that “all federal ALJs
are at risk of being declared inferior officers.”22 This Note argues that these
concerns are unwarranted and exaggerated. Even if a ruling that SEC ALJs
are “inferior officers” would disrupt the administrative system, the “fact
that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in
16. Gilley, Lazur & Vargas, supra note 15.
17. See Philip J. Griffin, Comment, Developments in SEC Administrative Proceedings:
An Evaluation of Recent Appointment Clause Challenges, the Rapidly Evolving Judicial
Landscape, and the SEC's Response to Critics, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 209, 218-19 (2016);
Joseph A. Grundfest, Fair or Foul?: SEC Administrative Proceedings and Prospects for
Reform Through Removal Legislation, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1143, 1165-66 (2016).
18. Griffin, supra note 17, at 218-19; see also Grundfest, supra note 17, at 1166-67.
19. Michael A. Carvin, Noel J. Francisco & Christian G. Vergonis, Massive, Unchecked
Power by Design: The Unconstitutional Exercise of Executive Authority by the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 199, 214 (2007).
20. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018).
21. Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1688, 1199-1201 (10th Cir. 2016) (McKay, J.,
dissenting).
22. Id. at 1199.
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facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is
contrary to the Constitution,” for “[c]onvenience and efficiency are not the
primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government.”23
By subjecting citizens to punishment imposed by an ALJ that was not
appointed by a politically accountable officer, the SEC denies one of the
“long term, structural protections against abuse of power” that the Framers
believed “critical to preserving liberty.”24 In addition, by channeling
enforcement actions to unaccountable ALJs, the SEC brings us closer to a
“government . . . ruled by functionaries” instead of officers appointed by
elected leaders accountable to the people.25 “It would be a bit much to
describe the result as ‘the very definition of tyranny,’ but the danger posed
by the growing power of the administrative state cannot be dismissed.”26
II. Law Before the Case
A. An Overview of the SEC and Administrative Proceedings
The SEC is an independent agency with five commissioners, all
appointed by the President and subject to Senate approval.27 To promote
integrity in the securities markets, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act) established a system of administrative supervision,
regulation of certain industry practices, and mandatory disclosure
requirements for companies whose securities were publicly traded on stock
exchanges.28 To execute this program, the Exchange Act created the SEC
and empowered it to enforce federal securities laws.29 The SEC may bring
enforcement actions in federal court or in an administrative proceeding. 30
The SEC derives its power to bring administrative enforcement actions
from The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which authorizes agencies
to conduct in-house administrative proceedings before an ALJ.31
An SEC administrative proceeding is an “in-house adjudication,” tried
before an ALJ, who renders an initial decision.32 Either the defendant or the
23. Bowshar v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
944 (1983)).
24. Id. at 730.
25. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499 (2010).
26. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 315 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2012).
28. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2012).
29. See id. § 78d(a).
30. See id. §§ 78u(d)(1), 78u–1 to –3.
31. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012).
32. 17 C.F.R. § 201.360 (2018).
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SEC can appeal the initial decision to the Commission itself.33 An appeal is
subject to de novo review by the Commissioners who can affirm, reverse,
modify, or remand the ALJ’s decision.34 If the SEC declines to review or
fails to review in a timely manner, however, the ALJ's decision becomes
the final decision of the SEC.35 If the SEC issues a decision unfavorable to
the appellee, that party may appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
within sixty days of the date the SEC entered its final order.36
B. The SEC and the Dodd-Frank Act
The passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 gave the SEC more power to
bring significant administrative actions. The Dodd-Frank Act expanded the
SEC’s ability to use administrative proceedings for enforcement purposes
by allowing them to initiate cases against non-regulated entities or
persons.37 The Act also provided the SEC “sole discretion” to decide
whether it should bring the case in an administrative proceeding or in
federal court.38 With this expansion of jurisdiction, ALJs may deliver
sanctions including cease-and-desist orders, disbarments, and large civil
penalties that have become powerful offensive weapons adversely affecting
a much larger group of people.39
After the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, the use of the administrative
process for SEC proceedings increased.40 Generally speaking, because of
the significant differences between administrative actions and those filed in
federal court, there exists a noteworthy “home-court advantage” to the
administrative arena.41 Because discovery is limited, and the proceedings
move forward swiftly, it can be much more difficult for a responding party
to develop the facts or mount an affirmative defense.42 Additionally, there is
33. Id. § 201.410.
34. Id. §§ 201.411(a), 201.452.
35. Id. § 201.411.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1); 17 C.F.R. § 201.410(e).
37. Geoffrey F. Aronow, Back to the Future: The Use of Administrative Proceedings for
Enforcement at the CFTC and SEC, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP., Jan.–Feb. 2015, at 1,
1.
38. Id. at 3.
39. David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1155, 1170
(2016).
40. Lisa Newman, Are SEC Administrative Proceedings the New [Unconstitutional]
Normal?, 36 REV. LITIG. 193, 201-02 (2017).
41. Zaring, supra note 39, at 1175.
42. Douglas Davison et al., Litigating with—and at—the SEC, 48 REV. SEC. &
COMMODITIES REG. 103, 108 (2015).
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no procedure available for a responding party to seek dismissal of the
allegations at the outset of the case—that opportunity is available only to
defendants in federal court.43 For these reasons, the SEC unsurprisingly
enjoys a higher rate of success in administrative proceedings than in federal
court. For example, in the fiscal year ending on September 30, 2014, the
SEC won 100% of its internal administrative hearings, while winning only
61% of its trials in federal court.44
C. The SEC ALJs
An SEC administrative enforcement proceeding is “presided over by one
of the five SEC ALJs.”45 Currently, the presiding ALJ is technically an
employee of the SEC.46 Nevertheless, the ALJ purportedly acts neutrally
and impartially when making decisions, even though the SEC is a party to
the proceeding. To preserve independence between the SEC and the ALJ,
the APA provides several safeguards.
First, the ALJs are hired through the Office of Professional Management
(OPM).47 The OPM prequalifies individuals, which means that the ALJ
applicants who meet the office's qualification standards must pass an
examination.48 The SEC’s Chief ALJ “then select[s] an ALJ from the top
three” candidates.49 This rigorous selection process represents just one of
the procedural safeguards designed to promote independence between ALJs
and the SEC.50 Second, ALJs are exempt from the annual performance
ratings to which other employees are subjected.51 OPM regulations also
provide that “[a]n agency may not rate the job performance of an
administrative law judge,” or grant “monetary or honorary awards or
incentives” to ALJs.52 Third, once hired, ALJs receive career appointment,
meaning they can be fired, suspended, or given a reduction in pay only “for
good cause established and determined” after a hearing in front of the Merit

43. Id.
44. Newman, supra note 40, at 195.
45. Kaela Dahan, Note, The Constitutionality of SEC Administrative Proceedings: The
SEC Should Cure Its ALJ Appointment Scheme, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1211, 1215 (2017).
46. See Zaring, supra note 39, at 1165.
47. 5 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012); 5 C.F.R. § 930.201 (2018).
48. 5 C.F.R. § 930.204.
49. VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34607, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGES: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2010), https://perma.cc/T8YY-EE7F.
50. Id. at 7.
51. 5 U.S.C. § 4301(2)(D) (2012).
52. 5 C.F.R. § 930.206.
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Systems Protection Board.53 Under this removal structure, three layers of
insulation protect these ALJs from removal by the President.54
D. The Appointments Clause and the Distinction Between “Employees” and
“Inferior Officers”
When an ALJ presides over an SEC enforcement action, the ALJ, in
essence, operates no differently than a federal judge—they must remain
independent, ethical, and impartial towards the litigating parties.55
Nonetheless, until recently, the prevailing idea was that SEC ALJs are
“employees” rather than “officers.”56 The current appointment process of
SEC ALJs is permitted because of this employee designation.57 However,
because the Dodd-Frank Act tremendously enlarged the quasi-judicial role
of SEC ALJs, now they more closely resemble “inferior officers” than
employees.58 This means that they should be appointed in compliance with
the Appointments Clause, which provides that:
[The President] ... shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress
may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or
in the Heads of Departments.59
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the
Appointments Clause, noting that it is “among the significant structural
safeguards of the constitutional scheme. . . designed to preserve political
accountability relative to important Government assignments.”60 By failing
to designate SEC ALJs as “officers,” Congress has “mask[ed], under
complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it makes on
the co-ordinate departments, and thus control[s] the nominal actions (e.g.,

53. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2012).
54. Zaring, supra note 39, at 1192.
55. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (“There can be little doubt that the
role of the modern federal . . . ALJ . . . is ‘functionally comparable’ to that of a judge.”).
56. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 930.201-11.
57. Lucia v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 289 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
58. Giles D. Beal IV, Judge, Jury, and Executioner: SEC Administrative Law Judges
Post-Dodd Frank, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 413, 423 (2016).
59. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
60. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 655, 663 (1997).
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appointments) of the other branches.”61 Thus, by removing the power to
appoint officers from the President (or department heads or courts of law),
Congress has commandeered executive power—a danger the Framers
aimed to prevent.62 By removing the power of the executive branch to
appoint officers, Congress consequently removes the accountability
safeguards of the executive branch. Citizens must be able to easily identify
the source of legislation or regulation that impacts their lives to prevent
Government officials from wielding power without ownership of the
consequences.63
E. Recent Case Law
Modern jurisprudence has had difficulty distinguishing “employees”
from “inferior officers.” The most recent Supreme Court case to address
this issue is Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.64 In Freytag, the
Supreme Court analyzed whether the Tax Court possessed the authority to
appoint special trial judges (STJs) under the Appointments Clause.65 As a
threshold matter, the Supreme Court determined whether STJs were
“inferior officers” by focusing on three factors.66 First, the position of the
STJ was established by law.67 Second, “the duties, salary and means of
appointment” of the STJ were established by statute.68 Third, the STJs
exercise significant discretion in carrying out important non-ministerial
functions.69 The Freytag Court noted that even though STJs do not have the
authority to render final decisions, they still exercise significant discretion
in carrying out important functions such as taking testimony, ruling on
evidence, conducting trials, and “enforcing compliance with discovery
orders.”70 Therefore, the Court concluded that STJs were “inferior Officers”
rather than “employees.”71
61. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 906 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
62. Brief for Pac. Legal Found. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9-10, Lucia,
832 F.3d 277 (No. 17-130), 2017 WL 3725916, at *9-10.
63. Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1234 (2015) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
64. 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
65. Id. at 872-73.
66. Id. at 881.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 881-82.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 882.
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Despite Freytag’s holding that final decision-making authority was not a
dispositive element, in Landry v. FDIC, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia emphasized this component in holding that the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) ALJs were “employees” and not
“inferior officers.”72 The Landry majority noted that the STJs in Freytag
had “authority to render the final decision of the Tax Court in declaratory
judgment proceedings and in certain small-amount tax cases.”73 The court
contrasted this with the role of FDIC ALJs; noting that although the FDIC
ALJs can recommend fact-finding determinations, legal conclusions, and
ultimate decisions, the ALJs cannot make final decisions for the FDIC. 74
Therefore, the court concluded that FDIC ALJs were not “inferior
officers.”75
Lucia was the first case to address whether the SEC ALJs are
“employees” or “inferior officers.”76 The D.C. Circuit held that SEC ALJs
were “employees,” creating a clear circuit split from the Tenth Circuit’s
decision in Bandimere.77 The court veered away from the three-part test
formulated in Freytag and invoked a different approach to determine
whether SEC ALJs exercise significant discretion in carrying out important
functions.78 The court indicated that once an appointee meets the two
threshold requirements—that the relevant position was established by law
and the position's duties, salary, and means of appointment are set forth in a
statute79—then "the main criteria for drawing the line between inferior
officers and employees . . . are (1) the significance of the matters resolved
by the officials, (2) the discretion they exercise in reaching their decisions,
and (3) the finality of those decisions.”80 Following this framework, the
D.C. Circuit held that because SEC ALJs can only recommend enforcement
action and do not have the congressional authority to “bind third parties,”
the third element of this analysis was not satisfied.81 Accordingly, a threejudge panel ruled that SEC ALJs are “employees.”82 Lucia subsequently
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
2000)).
80.
81.
82.

204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1133.
Id.
Id. at 1134.
See Lucia v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
Id.
See id. at 284; Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881–82 (1991).
Lucia, 832 F.3d at 284 (citing Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1133-34 (D.C. Cir.
Id. (quoting Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2012)).
Id. at 286.
See id.
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petitioned the D.C. Circuit for en banc review. However, the circuit split
was preserved after the Lucia court split evenly when reviewing the case en
banc, effectively affirming its earlier decision.83
The disagreement between the D.C. Circuit and the Tenth Circuit reflects
the conflicting outlooks on what it means to exercise “significant
authority.” On one hand, according to the D.C. Circuit, SEC ALJs can only
exercise “significant authority” by rendering a final decision.84 On the other
hand, according to the Tenth Circuit, “significant authority” can be
exercised solely by influencing the outcomes of SEC enforcement actions.85
III. Statement of the Case
In 2012, the SEC brought an administrative action against Colorado
businessman, David Bandimere, for violating various securities laws.86 An
ALJ conducted a hearing and issued an initial decision that found
Bandimere liable for securities fraud, barred him from the securities
industry, ordered him to disgorge the funds he received, and imposed civil
penalties.87 The SEC reviewed the ALJ’s initial decision and issued a
separate opinion affirming the result.88 Bandimere then petitioned the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals to review the SEC’s order.89 In his petition,
Bandimere argued that the SEC process of hiring ALJs was an
unconstitutional violation of the Appointments Clause, and therefore the
ALJ had no lawful authority to preside over his case.90 Diverging from
other federal courts, the Tenth Circuit set aside the SEC’s decision, holding
that the appointment of the ALJ who presided over Bandimere’s hearing
was not consistent with the requirements of the Appointments Clause.91

83. Lucia v. SEC, 868 F.3d 1021, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017), aff’g en banc 832 F.3d 277
(D.C. Cir. 2016).
84. Id.
85. Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1182-84 (10th Cir. 2016).
86. Id. at 1171.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1170.
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IV. Decision
A. Majority Opinion
In holding that the SEC’s hiring process for ALJs violated the
Appointments Clause, the court relied on Freytag and concluded that ALJs
are “inferior officers” and as such, they must be appointed by the President,
a court of law, or a department head.92 The court expressly rejected the
Lucia court’s determination that whether an ALJ possesses final decisionmaking authority is dispositive for determining inferior officer status, and
instead focused on Freytag’s three-prong test.93 Applying the Freytag test,
the court looked to (1) whether the position was established by law; (2)
whether the duties, salary, and means of appointment are delineated in a
statute; and (3) the amount of discretion exercised in carrying out important
functions that are “more than ministerial tasks.”94
First, the SEC ALJ position was “established by law,” in the APA.95
Second, SEC ALJs’ duties, salary, and means of appointment are governed
by statute.96 Third, the SEC ALJs exercise significant discretion in carrying
out “important functions,” including “ruling on the admissibility of
evidence, ruling on dispositive and procedural motions,” taking testimony,
“issuing subpoenas, and presiding over trial-like hearings,” which “the SEC
affords ’considerable weight’ during agency review.”97 The court rejected
the Lucia court’s focus on final decision-making power, holding that while
“[f]inal decision-making power is relevant in determining whether a public
servant exercises significant authority . . . that does not mean every inferior
officer must possess final decision-making power.”98 Finding that “SEC
ALJs closely resemble the STJs described in Freytag,” the Tenth Circuit
held SEC ALJs are inferior officers and thus must be appointed in
accordance with the Appointments Clause.99

92. Id. at 1179.
93. Id. at 1179-85.
94. Id. at 1179, 1181 (quoting Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881-82 (1991)).
95. Id. at 1179 (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1179-80 (quoting Bandimere, SEC Release No. 9972, Securities Act Release
No. 76308, Exchange Act Release No.33-9972, 2015 WL 6575665, at *15 n.83 (Oct. 29,
2015)).
98. Id. at 1183-84.
99. Id. at 1181.
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B. Concurring Opinion
In a concurring opinion, Judge Mary Beck Briscoe refuted the dissent’s
assertion that the majority’s ruling potentially invalidates all ALJs and not
simply SEC ALJs.100 Judge Briscoe argued that even if the majority
decision potentially invalidated appointment of all current ALJs, the longterm effects would be minor because courts generally seek “the minimum
relief necessary to bring administrative overreach in line with the
Constitution.”101 Judge Briscoe also criticized the dissent's reliance on
Landry and Lucia, asserting that although “final decision-making power
might be sufficient to make an employee an officer, that does not mean that
such authority is necessary” to make an employee an officer.102 Instead, she
argued that the court should examine all the “duties and functions” that the
ALJ has been delegated “to determine whether that person is exercising the
authority of the United States” and is therefore an officer.103
C. Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Judge Monroe McKay pointed out that the consequences
of the Bandimere decision extended far beyond the SEC and its five ALJs.
Judge McKay noted that “under the majority’s interpretation of Freytag, all
federal ALJs are at risk of being declared inferior officers . . . effectively
render[ing] invalid thousands of administrative actions.”104 In response to
Judge McKay’s concerns, Judge Briscoe, writing for the concurrence, noted
that Freytag requires courts to “engage in a case-by-case analysis” of the
status of government employees, and that the Bandimere decision was
limited to the SEC’s five ALJs.105
McKay also argued that “Freytag, which was decided twenty-five years
ago, should not apply because it has never before been extended by a circuit
court to any ALJ.”106 McKay asserted that the majority was incorrect in
concluding that the STJs of the tax court in Freytag were analogous to the
SEC’s ALJs.107 “[T]he [STJs] at issue in Freytag had the . . . power to bind
the Government and third parties” while “SEC ALJs do not.”108 He
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 1189 (Briscoe, J., concurring).
Id. at 1190.
Id. at 1192.
Id. at 1191.
Id. at 1199 (McKay, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1188-89 (Briscoe, J., concurring).
Id. at 1201 (McKay, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1194.
Id.
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contended that the SEC ALJs lack of “final decision-making authority”
should be determinative, and “under the Appointments Clause, that
difference makes all the difference.”109
D. Petition for Certiorari and ALJ Ratifications
Following Bandimere, the solicitor general and the SEC filed a short
petition for certiorari, but noted that Lucia was a better vehicle to decide the
issue.110 When the Lucia petition for certiorari was first filed, many
confidently predicted it would be granted.111 However, the case took a
surprising turn when the solicitor general filed a brief in support of
certiorari, abruptly abandoning his defense of the SEC ALJ hiring scheme
and accepting the petitioner's claim that the SEC's ALJs are in fact “inferior
officers” subject to the Appointments Clause requirements.112 Seemingly in
response to these developments, and in an attempt to stave off Supreme
Court review, the SEC issued an order (“Ratification Order”) ratifying the
appointment of the SEC’s five ALJs to mitigate any concern that their
decisions and operations violated the Appointments Clause.113 While the
SEC and the petitioners for certiorari now agree that SEC ALJs are
“inferior officers” subject to the Appointments Clause, the Supreme Court
was not bound by the solicitor general’s and SEC’s characterization. The
issue was not moot because the Supreme Court ruling affects dozens of
other federal agencies that also utilize ALJs.114 Additionally, by ratifying
the ALJ appointments, the SEC may have opened the door to other
challenges regarding the restrictions on ALJs’ removal because the SEC’s
ratification process addresses only the hiring, and not the firing, of ALJs.115

109. Id.
110. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bandimere, 844 F.3d 1168 (No. 17-475).
111. Jonathon H. Adler, Is Lucia Still Cert-Worthy?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 2, 2018,
10:33 PM), http://reason.com/volokh/2018/01/02/is-lucia-still-cert-worthy (“When the Lucia
cert petition was first filed, it seemed like an almost certain grant.”).
112. Brief for Respondent at 9-22, Lucia v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No. 17130), 2017 WL 5899983, at *9-22.
113. Pending Admin. Proceedings, SEC Release No. 4816, Securities Act Release No.
10440, Exchange Act Release No. 32929, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-32929,
2017 WL 5969234, at *1 (Nov. 30, 2017).
114. See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 5-6, Lucia, 832 F.3d 277 (No. 17-130), 2017 WL
6383147, at *5-6.
115. See id.
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V. Analysis
A. The Tenth Circuit Correctly Applied the Freytag Analysis
The Tenth Circuit explained that the D.C. Circuit's decisions in Landry
and Lucia incorrectly applied Freytag's framework because “[finaldecision-making authority] was not dispositive to Freytag's holding.”116
The Supreme Court in Lucia also found Freytag determinative.117 In
Freytag, the Court expressly rejected the contention that lack of power to
make final decisions takes officials outside the Appointments Clause.118
Under Freytag, only duties, authority, and power determine whether
significant discretion is exhibited; decision-making authority is sufficient,
but not necessary, to find that an official is an officer.119 “Although ALJs
can be distinguished from STJs in many ways, the principle similarities
they do share are the ones that consider them inferior officers.”120 SEC
ALJs have statutory roots and “exercise the same ‘significant discretion’
when carrying out the same ‘important functions’ as STJs do,” such as
taking testimony, conducting trials, ruling on evidentiary issues and
enforcing discovery orders.121 Moreover, an ALJ initial decision, unlike
STJ findings or opinions, can become final without being reviewed by the
Commission.122 Not only do SEC ALJs exercise significant authority,
making them “inferior officers,” but their current appointment scheme
deprives the people of any ability to hold the appointed official accountable
for the consequential actions of the SEC ALJs.
B. The Concern That Bandimere Will Have a Wide-Sweeping Harmful
Effect Is Unwarranted and Exaggerated
1. Holding That ALJs Are “Inferior Officers” Will Not Call into
Question the Constitutionality of All Prior Decisions Rendered by ALJs
The SEC issued the Ratification Order ratifying the appointment of the
SEC’s five ALJs with the intent to “resolve[] any concerns” regarding any
116. SEC v. Bandimere, 844 F.3d 1168, 1182-85 & n.36 (10th Cir. 2016).
117. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2047 (2018).
118. See Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 881-82 (1991).
119. Id.
120. Thomas C. Rossidis, Article II Complications Surrounding SEC-Employed
Administrative Law Judges, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 773, 805 (2016).
121. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2048 (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881-82). 138 S.Ct. 2044,
2055 ple, the Social Security Administration,remedy, the actual effect on other agencies is
less clear. e Appoin
122. Id.
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potential Appointments Clause weakness.123 However, whether this order
actually cures any impending constitutional issues depends on the stage of a
case in the administrative process. The SEC’s move to ratify the
appointment of its ALJs has a different effect depending on whether the
case is closed, pending, or not yet brought.
The Ratification Order is silent on what is to be done in closed cases and
cases currently on appeal to a federal court.124 These cases have already
resulted in an initial decision and a Commission order affirming that
decision; this silence fails to resolve the uncertainty surrounding those
decisions.125 Because SEC ALJs are “inferior officers,” there is uncertainty
whether parties in closed cases could claim that their constitutional rights
were violated by improperly-appointed ALJs and subsequently sue for
damages based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia. This list of
potential claimants would include those who had previously paid penalties
or were banned from the industry.126 Nonetheless, any ALJ decisions for
which appeals have been denied or time to appeal has expired would likely
be considered final and binding decisions.127 “Final administrative decisions
would not be subject to [collateral] attack . . . even when an adjudicator
lacks the power to decide a case [due to] the presumption in favor of
finality.”128 The Supreme Court has made this presumption clear by holding
that even when the judge lacked the authority to preside over a case, the
defect cannot be attacked collaterally once a judgment has become final.129

123. Press Release, SEC, SEC Ratifies Appointment of Administrative Law Judges (Nov.
30, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-215.
124. See id.
125. See id. There are currently around a dozen cases on appeal from the SEC in the
federal courts. Lucia v. SEC, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Lucia_v._SEC (last
visited Sept. 22, 2018).
126. N. Peter Rasmussen, Messy Clouds and Inferior Officers—The SEC, ALJs and
Order Maintained, BNA: CORP. TRANSACTIONS BLOG (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.bna.com/
messy-clouds-inferior-b73014472686/.
127. See 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (2012).
128. Griffin, supra note 17, at 229.
129. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 154 (2009) (noting that res
judicata and practical necessity prevent collateral attacks on jurisdiction on final orders);
Peter D. Hardy, Carolyn H. Kendall & Abraham J. Rein, The Appointment of SEC
Administrative Law Judges: Constitutional Questions and Consequences for Enforcement
Actions (June 22, 2015), http://www.postschell.com/site/files/post__schell__bloomberg_
bna__sec_alj_constitutional_questions__6_19_15.pdf (reprint of article from 47 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 1238); Alison Frankel, Unlike SEC, FTC Makes Quick Fix to Ward of ALJ
Constitutional Challenges, REUTERS: BLOGS (Sept. 16, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/
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Thus, it is likely that parties with final administrative determinations will be
unable to successfully attack those rulings collaterally on the grounds that
the ALJs were appointed unconstitutionally.
The Ratification Order explicitly addressed cases pending before the ALJ
or the Commission.130 The Order directed that, in all proceedings currently
pending before an ALJ or the Commission, the same ALJ who conducted
the proceedings in the first instance must reconsider the entire record, allow
the parties to submit new evidence, re-examine all prior judicial rulings,
and issue an order regarding the same.131 However, the Lucia Court held
that a different ALJ must conduct the new proceeding.132 More than one
hundred pending cases must be reconsidered pursuant to the Supreme
Court’s holding.133
The Ratification Order also addresses the constitutionality of any future
ALJ decisions.134 As long as the judge has been properly appointed, no
future administrative proceedings before an SEC ALJ will have a claim on
appeal for vacatur of a decision based on the Appointments Clause.135
However, Lucia argued that the Ratification Order is not a constitutionally
permissible way to appoint an Officer and “has no effect on any other
case.”136 The Lucia Court did not address whether additional remedial
action by the Commission is necessary.137 However, the Commission, as the
head of department, has the power to appoint ALJs and did so by
ratification.138 The Restatement (Third) of Agency specifies that
“[r]atification is the affirmance of a prior act done by another, whereby the
act is given effect as if done by an agent acting with actual authority.” 139 In
other words, there must first be an unauthorized act in order for it to be

alison-frankel/2015/09/16/unlike-sec-ftc-makes-quick-fix-to-ward-off-alj-constitutionalchallenges/.
130. Pending Admin. Proceedings, SEC Release No. 4816, Securities Act Release No.
10440, Exchange Act Release No. 32929, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-32929,
2017 WL 5969234, at *1 (Nov. 30, 2017).
131. Id.
132. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018).
133. See Pending Admin. Proceedings, at *3 (listing proceedings remanded to ALJs).
134. See id. at *1.
135. Press Release, supra note 123; Heidi VonderHeide, SEC Decrees That Its ALJs Are
Constitutional. Now What?, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=bcfe3890-dee9-41ef-a9b6-2b91fd392203.
136. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 114 at 8.
137. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2055.
138. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.01(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
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ratified and given retroactive effect. However, Lucia also argued that the
Commission’s lack of involvement in hiring (not appointing) its ALJs
means there was no prior appointment to be ratified.140 In Lucia’s view, the
Commission cannot ratify an unconstitutional act.141
Lucia’s argument mischaracterizes a cornerstone principle of agency
law. A principal’s “ratification retroactively creates the effects of actual
authority,” as long as it manifests its consent to the action being ratified. 142
By stating that it was “ratif[ying] the agency’s prior appointment” of its five
ALJs, the Commission clearly manifests consent to and approval of the
prior appointments of its ALJs.143 Adopting Lucia’s understanding “would
turn concepts of agency law on their head by requiring the principal to have
been involved in the decision to be ratified.”144 The doctrine of ratification
would be pointless if principals could ratify decisions only where they had
initial involvement.145 The SEC asserts that “it is apparent that the
Appointments Clause does not bar Congress from limiting the pool of
prospective appointees from which the Commission may appoint its [ALJs]
and does not require the Commissioners to play any part in the selection of
the [ALJs], other than the actual appointing.”146
2. Holding That SEC ALJs Are “Inferior Officers” Does Not Spell the
End of Enforcement Actions by ALJs Across the Entire Administrative
System
Some are concerned that holding that SEC ALJs are officers could spell
the end of enforcement actions by ALJs across the entire administrative
system.147 This concern is exaggerated. As an initial matter, agencies can
avoid this issue by ratifying the appointment of its ALJs. However, if
ratification is not a constitutionally permissible remedy, the actual effect on
other agencies is less clear.

140. See Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 114, at 8.
141. Id.
142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 4.01, 4.02.
143. Pending Admin. Proceedings, SEC Release No. 4816, Securities Act Release No.
10440, Exchange Act Release No. 32929, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-32929,
2017 WL 5969234, at *1 (Nov. 30, 2017).
144. See Order Denying Motion for Stay, David Pruitt, CPA, Administrative Proceedings
Rulings Release No. 5603, at 5 n.27 (Feb. 15, 2018).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 7.
147. See SEC v. Bandimere, 844 F.3d 1168, 1199 (10th Cir. 2016) (McKay, J.,
dissenting).
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Additionally, many agencies, including, for example, the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”), might not be affected because they are
distinguishable from the SEC ALJs and the Freytag STJs.148 The SSA
employs 1655 ALJs, which is a vast majority of all the federal ALJs.149
Judge McKay commented in his dissent that he “cannot discern a
meaningful difference between SEC ALJs and [Social Security
Administration] ALJs under the majority’s reading of Freytag.”150 The
dissent’s concern is overblown because whether those ALJs are also
“inferior officers” turns on the scope of their individual functions and
discretion.151 The Freytag analysis proceeds case-by-case, and this case
deals only with the duties and qualities of a particular set of five SEC ALJs,
and not, for example, with the different characteristics of the SSA ALJs
who make up the bulk of all federal ALJs.152 Therefore, the only way the
Supreme Court could resolve SSA ALJ status is if the Court adopted the
reasoning in Lucia, focusing solely on final decision-making power.153
However, even under the Freytag analysis the SSA ALJs would likely not
be considered “inferior officers.”154
Although SEC ALJs and SSA ALJs might share some of the same
duties, there are unique distinctions potentially relevant to their analysis
under the Appointments Clause. For example, SSA ALJs wear the hats of
both a judge and an agency attorney with the duty of examining witnesses
and developing the record to ensure that only deserving claimants get
paid.155 They do not conduct adversarial hearings similar to those conducted
by an SEC ALJ trial determining alleged securities violations.156 In Lucia,
on rehearing en banc, Petitioner’s attorneys argued that finding that the

148. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2058 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
149. Administrative Law Judges: ALJs by Agency, U.S. OFF. OF PERSONNEL MGMT.,
https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-byAgency (last updated March 2017).
150. Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1200 (McKay, J., dissenting).
151. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 19, Lucia v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (en banc) (No.
15-1345), 2017 WL 947745.
152. Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1188-89 (Briscoe J., concurring).
153. See Lucia, 832 F.3d at 286.
154. See Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 881-82 (1991).
155. See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 111 (2000) (“It is the ALJ’s duty to investigate the
facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits . . . .”).
156. Frank S. Bloch, Jeffrey S. Lubbers & Paul R. Verkuil, Developing a Full and Fair
Evidentiary Record in a Nonadversary Setting: Two Proposals For Improving Social
Security Disability Adjudications, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 3 (2003).
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SEC ALJs were unconstitutionally appointed would not affect the
thousands of ALJs employed by the SSA because the fact “that those judges
are engaged in the doling out of government largess rather than executing
enforcement powers on behalf of the president, makes all the difference.”157
Even if other agency ALJ appointment schemes violate the Constitution,
agencies that have amended their ALJ appointment process in the past have
shown that they are unlikely to experience any significant disruption.158
Although there may be some minor inconvenience because SEC ALJs were
found to be “inferior officers,” constitutional requirements should not yield
to convenience and expediency.159 “Certainly the possibility of additional
violations of the Constitution does not justify turning a blind eye to the
Constitution's requirements.”160
VI. Conclusion
SEC ALJs wield incredible power that can impact individuals as well as
the financial industry as a whole. The considerable increase in power SEC
ALJs attained post Dodd-Frank, combined with their many quasi-judicial
duties, indicates that SEC ALJs no longer act as mere “employees.” The
court’s decision in Bandimere correctly determined that SEC ALJs are
“inferior officers” and must be appointed in accordance with the
Appointments Clause. This decision determined that SEC ALJs are officers
by applying the analysis developed in Freytag, notwithstanding that SEC
ALJs do not have final decision-making authority.
Classifying SEC ALJs as officers promotes the purpose of the
Appointments Clause—to ensure that those who wield appointment power
are accountable to political force and the will of the American people. 161
The concern that holding SEC ALJs are officers will have a far-reaching
undesirable result is unwarranted. It will not render past decisions invalid
157. Oral Argument at 19:30, Lucia v. SEC, on reh’g en banc, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir.
2017), https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/recordings2017.nsf/B5D9C12F894EF5D5
8525812A005C2AB5/$file/15-1345.mp3.
158. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 12, 2008, Pub. L. 110-313, § 1, 122 Stat. 3014, 3014
(amending the method of appointing administrative patent and trademark judges to be by the
Secretary of Commerce); In re LabMD, Inc., No. 9357, 2015 WL 5608167, at *2 (F.T.C.
Sept. 14, 2015) (noting reappointment of FTC administrative law judge).
159. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 944 (1983)).
160. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, supra note 146, at 19.
161. Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 884 (1991).
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because the presumption in favor of finality prevents them from being
attacked collaterally. Further, the concern is exaggerated because this
holding does not spell the end of enforcement actions by ALJs across the
entire administrative system. The Freytag analysis is employed on a caseby-case basis, and each set of agency ALJs will be considered individually
to determine if the judges in question have the level of authority that would
earn them inferior officer status. The holding causes a slight inconvenience
to the administrative system, but convenience and efficiency are not the
primary objectives of our government. Rather, the protection of liberty is
chief among our government’s goals. Requiring the appointment of SEC
ALJs to comport with the Appointments Clause secures the liberty of the
American people by assuring the appropriate elected official is accountable
for agency decision-making.
Abbey Zuech
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